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Abstract 
This report contains a critical review of Jan 
Beyea's report: A Study of Some of the Conse-
quences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at 
Barseback (Princeton University, January 1978). 
The conclusion of the evaluation is that the 
early consequences in particular are much over-
estimated because of rough approximations and 
the inclusion of unrealistic sets of parameters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 1978 the Swedish Energy Commission issued a report 
with the title "A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypotheti-
cal Reactor Accidents at Barseback". This report was prepared 
for the Commission by Jan Beyea, Center for Environmental Studies, 
Princeton University, as a critical check of the official Swedish 
calculations. 
At the request of the Commission, a draft of the Beyea report 
was commented upon by Risø in October 1977. These comments were 
fcrwarded to the Energy Commission, who thereafter forwarded them 
to Beyea. In a similar fashion, comments were made on Beyea's 
draft report by AB Atomenergi, Sweden, and by the Sandia Labora-
tories, USA. 
These comments led the author to revise his presentation on a 
few points, but, in spite of the criticism raised, the conclusions 
of the provisional report remained unaltered in the final report. 
In the following, comments are given on the points in the Beyea 
report that are the main reason why its results for early conse-
quences deviate significantly from the results of other, similar 
calculations, hereunder those described in Risø Report No. 356: 
"Calculation of the Individual and Population Doses on Danish 
Territory Resulting from Hypothetical Core-Melt Accidents at the 
Barseback Reactor". 
METHOD 
In the Risø Report the relevant parameters were chosen so as to 
maximize the doses in the Copenhagen area, in as much as the 
choice took into account the correlation of the parameters and 
the probability distribution of their magnitudes. Thereafter 
the doses were calculated as a function of distance from Barse-
back, assuming that the concentration in the plume is normally 
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distributed both vertically and horizontally in the plane at 
right angles to the wind direction. 
Beyea calculates the doses at a number of distances from Barse-
back in the wind direction. These distances are stated for the 
area within 50 km of Barseback, where he uses the distances 5, 
10, 15, 20 up to 50 km. He considers the calculated doses 
to apply to areas that lie symmetrically around the calculation 
points and have the width of the plume (3 o ) and a length of 
5 km (in the wind direction). This implies a very rough picture 
of the geographical distribution of the doses. For example, 
Beyea1s intervals are particularly inappropriate in connection 
with Copenhagen. As figure 1 shows, one of his calculation points 
is placed on the coast of the Sound. The dose that is calculated 
at chis point will not be the average dose for the sub-area that 
receives the highest doses in Copenhagen. Due to the threshold 
effect for early consequences, this may give en overestimation 
of these consequences. 
Beyea varies the model parameters over a large interval, making 
totally 1000 calculations with parameter values chosen by Monte 
Carlo technique. We doubt that 1000 calculations are enough to 
give a good picture of the significance of the parameters when 
so many parameters are varied independently. In addition, the 
choice of the parameter intervals is unrealistic in several 
cases. This point is further discussed later in the present 
report. 
RISE OP THE HOT RADIOACTIVE CLOUD 
Beyea's report does not include any calculation of the height 
that the hot cloud would reach as a result of buoyancy. The 
height is picked randomly in the interval between zero and an 
upper limit, which is representative of the extent of the atmos-
pheric boundary layer. The height is ascribed the same probability 
over the whole interval. Thus the results are quite unrealisti-
eally influenced by the large consequences that can be conceived 
as results of extreme values of the plume rise combined with 
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extreme values for the dry deposition velocity (see figure 4). 
The author defends this method (page 11-11) by reference to an 
article by G.A.Briggs, an atmosphere physicist, whose work on 
smoke plume rise is generally acknowledged. The quotation is 
taken from the introduction to the article, where Briggs opposes 
the numerous, often unusable formulas for calculating smoke plume 
rise that have appeared. However, the same article ends up with 
a derivation of the formula used in Risø Report No. 356 to calcu-
late the plume rise. Briggs remarks that this formula is "widely 
supported by field observations and by some modelling experiments. 
Perhaps over 90% of field observations of buoyant plumes are ap-
proximated by this formula". WASH-1400 (the CRAC manual) and Risø 
both use the Briggs formula for calculating the plume rise. 
Briggs formula includes the final height. To advoid an iteration in the cal-
culations, it is generally chosen to calculate conservatively, i.e., to in-
sert a height that is so small that the maximum concentration is not underesti-
mated. In all Risø*s calculations this height was set to 25 m, which is less 
than the smallest plume rise calculated (43 m). 
In the discussion of the plume rise used by Risø (table II-l, 
page 11-10), Beyea assumes that the heat release is proportional 
to the thermal reactor power. The heat content of an accidental 
release depends, however, on many factors, among others the de-
sign of the reactor (content of water in the reactor tank and 
the wet well) and the duration of the accident. In WASH-1400 no 
simple correlation between heat release and reactor power is as-
sumed, and therefore no such down-scaling was made in Risø Re-
port No. 356. The method suggested by Beyea cannot, however, be 
called unreasonable. 
In Risø's provisional comments it was pointed out that Beyea 
did not take into account the self-heating of the release due 
to radioactive decay. In the activity release under consideration, 
the radioactive decay would develop a power of 2000-5000 kw, which 
would imply a further lift of the cloud. This additional lift is 
not taken into account in the calculations made at Risø, but it 
is pointed out that, in the majority of the cases, the doses 
are therefore overestimated. As Beyea emphasizes (page 11-11) , 
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the results are very sensitive to the plume rise, hence it is 
surprising that he still neglects this effect in his final report. 
DRY DEPOSITION OF RADIOACTIVITY ON THE GROUND 
Beyea's method of c a l c u l a t i n g the r a d i o a c t i v i t y dry-deposited on 
the ground d e v i a t e s considerably from the method of c a l c u l a t i o n 
used by Risø . This d i f f erence means t h a t , for r e l e a s e s at 
ground l e v e l (such cases are included in Beyea's c a l c u l a t i o n s ) 
combined with large depos i t ion ra te s (see the s e c t i o n on depo-
s i t i o n v e l o c i t y ) , the a c t i v i t y deposi ted becomes more than 1000 
t imes greater than that ca l cu la ted by Risø . In s t a b l e weather 
s i t u a t i o n s t h i s app l i e s t o d is tances up to 50 km from the point 
of r e l e a s e . As the maximum consequences, according to Beyea, are 
those tha t o r i g i n a t e from radiat ion from a c t i v i t y deposited in 
s t a b l e weather s i t u a t i o n s (page J - 1 4 ) , t h i s d i f ference can lead 
t o extremely dev ia t ing r e s u l t s . 
The difference between the calculation methods used by Beyea and those used 
by Risø may briefly be described as follows: 
Beyea takes into account building turbulence (initial dispersion) by calcu-
lating the distribution of the activity as i f i t was released at a 'fictive' 
release point placed behind the actual release point. The location of this 
fictive release point i s determined by assuming that the vertical dispersion 
parameter must have a given value at the actual source point. This value is 
determined on the basis of assumptions about the dimensions of the building, 
and is thus independent of atmospheric stability. In connection herewith, 
dry deposition i s calculated as i f i t started at the actual release point, 
so that there Is no deposition for the distance between the fictive and the 
actual release point. 
Figure 2 shows the difference between the results in a situation with and 
without a fictive release point, respectively, in a stable weather sltaution 
with low wind speed (Pasquill F, wind speed u - 1 m/s and deposition velocity 
v - 1 cm/s). 
» Figure 2. Rate of deposition on the ground 
i normalized to the release rate. 
10 20 50 100 
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The curves are calculated on the basis of a smoke plume model where the 
concentration i s assuaed to be uniformly distributed. The width and height 
of the plume are given by a*jr and 6*x , respectively, where x i s the distance 
from the release point in the wind direct ion. The parameters a, 6, p and q 
are f i t t ed to the usual Pasquill-Gifford dispersion parameters. 
Curve 1 shows the normalized deposition rate on the ground (deposited amount 
per unit area per unit time/released amount per unit time from a release at 
ground l e v e l ) . Curve 2 shows the deposition rate for a release from a f i c t ive 
release point located 1000 ra behind the actual release point, and assuming 
that the deposition s tarts at the actual release point. At distances greater 
than a couple of km from the actual release point, the amount deposited on 
the ground w i l l be 6 times larger for situations with a f ic t ive release 
point. With a wind speed of 2 m/s and a deposition velocity of 10 cm/s, the 
amount deposited wi l l be 1000 times greater, as already mentioned. Corre-
sponding results are found for a Gaussian dispersion model. 
I t i s primarily Beyea's assumption that dry deposition starts at the 
actual release point that gives r i se to the large differences in question. 
This assumption i s questionable. Normally, i t must be assumed that turbulence 
around a building wi l l strongly increase the deposition, so that the depo-
s i t ion i s much greater here than in the open country. To take this into con-
sideration, the deposition should at least be calculated as i f i t started 
at the f i c t i ve release point. If so, the deposition rate on the ground wil l 
coincide with curve 1 at downwind distances greater than a few kilometres. 
CHOICE OF DRY DEPOSITION VELOCITIES 
In the same way as for the plume r i s e AH, Beyea s e l e c t s the 
depos i t ion v e l o c i t y v vrithin a broad in terva l (0 .1 - 10 c m / s ) . 
He takes v as a random var iable d i s t r ibuted uniformly on a log 
s c a l e . The use of a log sca l e ensures that the low va lues are 
treated on an equal foot ing with the high v a l u e s . Beyea e s t imates 
(page I I I - 7 ) that the method of choosing AH and v randomly in 
a broad in terva l impl ies a ten-doubling of the consequences 
r e l a t i v e to the WASH-1400 method, where AH i s ca l cu la ted and v„ 
i s ascribed a mean va lue . 
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In Beyea's report it is stated tpaoe II-8) that use of his method 
ensures that the worst cases associated with the unknown parameters 
are included. If the purpose of Beyea's study is to estimate the 
consequences of a reactor accident at Barseback rather than to 
•ake a mathematical parameter study, we consider his method to 
be unsuitable. 
H.G.N. Slinn, in "Some Coarents on Parameterizarions for Resuspension and 
for Net and Dry Deposition of Particles and Gases for Use in Radiation Dose 
Calculations", Hay 1977, states that there are a number of experimental 
results for the dependence of v on the particle size of the material in 
question. In WASH-1400 (appendix VI page K-l and K-6) it is stated that 
the expected particle size in a release from a core melt accident is of the 
order of magnitude of a few microns in diameter and hardly larger than 10 
microns. 
This assuaption is confirmed by the Karlsruhe reports: Nukleare Aerosole ia 
geschlossenen System (KFK 1985), PARDISEKO III - A Computer Code for Deter-
mining the Behaviour of Contained Nuclear Aerosols (KFK 2151) and Projekt 
Nukleare Sicherheit (KFK 2130, page 276-299}, in which are described problems 
concerning radioactive aerosols created inside a reactor containment during 
a fuel melt. These reports give results of model calculations based on ex-
perimental investigations where UO_ is evaporated. The size distribution 
of the nuclear aerosols is stated to be log-normal with a geometric mean 
diameter of 0.1-0.3 micron. 
If, in accordance with these references, it is assumed that the expected par-
ticle size in a core aelt release lies in the range 0.1-10 micron, then the 
deposition velocity lies in the range 0.005-1 ca/s for areas of land (cf. 
fig. 3). 
Furthermore, measurements made on Danish territory of the deposition velocity 
of short-lived fission products (iodine among others) from Chinese nuclear 
weapons testing show that the deposition velocity for these materials lies in 
the range 0.1-1 ca/s (Risø Report No. 361: Environmental Radioactivity in 
Denmark in 1976 by A. Aarkrog and J. Lippert). Although reactor accidents and 
nuclear weapons testing cannot be directly compared, the particles in ques-
tion aay be expected to be more or less of the same sizes as the material re-
leased in a reactor accident. This confirms the assuaption that the deposition 
velocities are less than 1 ca/s. Beyea's choice of deposition velocities as 
li 
-* ' ' » ' " » • • . . . . . . . 1 . 1 t • . I . . . . I . I 
10"* 10"' 10* 10' 
PARTICLE DIAMETER D **• 
Figure 3. The influence of particle size on deposition 
velocity. For areas of land the deposition velocity will 
be in the interval 0.005 - 1 cm/s for particle sizes be-
tween 0.1 ^m and 10 »m. 
Source: W.G.N. Slinn, Some Comments on Parameterizations 
for Resuspension and for Met and Dry Deposition of Par-
ticles and Gases for Use in Radiation Dose Calculations. 
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.1 M/sec .01 M/sec •001 M/sec 
Deposition Velocity 
Figure k. Sample Dose Contours [ Figure II-8 in Beyea's report ] at 1? 
miles from a BWR 1 accident. 2m/sec wind, stability class F, 2k hr 
ground dose. 
In Beyea's calculations all points on the figure are considered possible 
and therefore he finds doses up to 400 rem. For particle sizes between 
0.1 and 10 nm (see figure 3)» and with the plume rises calculated from 
Briggs' formula,the doses will probably lie in the hatched area 
being less than 100 rem. 
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large as 10 en/s is therefore unrealistic. 
The influence of deposition velocity/plume rise is shown in Beyea's 
report on page 11-20. On a copy of figure 11-8 (figure 4) an area 
is drawn that comprises the most probable values for deposition 
rate and plume rise. The value for plume rise used in Risø-M-1905 
is 175 m. Even if the amount of heat released is assumed to be 
halved (as stated by Beyea), the contribution from the decay heat 
would be sufficent for the cloud to rise to about 175-200 m in 
the distance stated (cf. F.A. Gifford: The Rise of Strongly Radio-
active Plumes, Journal of Applied Meterology 6, 644, August 1967). 
As Beyea assumes that the two parameters AH and v are equally 
probable over the.whole interval, he finds doses of up to 400 
rem at a distance of 17 miles, where they may probably be lower 
than loo rem. 
CHOICE OF WET DEPOSITION VELOCITIES 
In calculating the activity washed oat on the ground during pre-
cipitation, Beyea chooses only one value for the wash-out coef-
ficient which, according to WASH-1400, applies to rain intensities 
of between 2 and 5 mm rain per hour. It would be more correct, 
and in agreement with the treatment of,e.g., the dry deposition 
velocity, if a distribution of the wash-out coefficient had been 
used which corresponded to the distribution of the rain intensity 
in the area of the Sound. 
Beyea emphasizes (page J-12) that rain does not dominate his 
results unless his plume rise and dry deposition treatment is 
rejected. As stated in the foregoing section, we reject this 
treatment, and hence rain becomes dominant and arguments about 
wash-out coefficients become significant. In a rain situation, 
radiation doses to bone marrow are largely proportional to the 
wash-out coefficient, as the bone marrow dose is dominated by 
radiation from washed-out activity on the ground. 
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POPULATION DENSITY AND SHIELDING FACTOR 
The method of letting the shielding factor depend on the popu-
lation density (shielding for wooden houses is used for popu-
2 
lation densities of <80 people A m ) is incorrect and leads to an 
overestimation of the doses in Denmark, the United Kingdom and 
on the North European mainland. In these areas only very few 
houses are built of wood, regardless of the population density. 
Furthermore, far too rough a method is used for the determination 
of the population density in the area between 50 km and 1000 km. 
The population densities given in table II-9, page II-3(v are 
weighted mean values that cover large local variations in popu-
lation densities. Mean values are calculated for sector sections 
that cover both areas of water (the North Sea, the Baltic, etc.) 
as well as large towns (Hamburg, Amsterdam, etc.). The use of the 
mean population densities stated in the calculation of popu-
lation doses, and the consequences derived herefrom, will give 
rise to errors, partly because of the large variations in popu-
lation densities as mentioned, and partly because even relatively 
densely populated areas can, by this averaging, be placed under 
the fictive limit for wooden buildings. 
In addition, Beyea's method of calculating individual doses from 
the passage of the cloud is incorrect. Statistically considered, 
20% of the population are out of doors during the day and 80% are 
inside buildings. However, Beyea uses the approach that, for each 
geographical sub-area (5 km x 3a ), the whole population is con-
sidered as being all outside or all inside buildings. It is inad-
equate to suppose that in 20% of the sub-areas the population is 
outside and in 80% the population is inside. This method may give 
reasonable results if the areas considered are small in relation 
to the characteristic dimensions of the cloud. Beyea's areas, 
which have the width of the oloud and a length of 5 km, are however 
so large that, for example, the whole population in the most ex-
posed quarters of Copenhagen may be assumed to be out of doors 
during the passage of the cloud. A considerable number of his 
calculations for the Copenhagen area therefore result in too high 
doses, and thus in excessive consequences. 
UNCERTAINTY 
15 
When a Monte Carlo method is used, the validity of the results 
depends on the number of simulations carried out. The adequacy 
of the number of simulations can only be established by estimat-
ing the uncertainty of the results. It is therefore a shortcoming 
of Beyea's work that this has not been done. 
Beyea apparently maintains that the uncertainties can be estimated 
or eliminated by drawing a smoothed curve (comments to fig. II-lo, 
page 11-39). However, a smoothed curve gives in itself no guaran-
tee of a reliable result. If the shape of the curve had been 
estimated in advance, and if the results had proved to fit the 
expectations, then the results would have inspired more confi-
dence. Alternatively, several simulations in blocks of 1000 could 
be carried out and then drawn. If the curves from the individual 
blocks agreed mutually, then again there would be more confidence 
in the results. The text indicates (page 11-38) an approach to 
the last procedure*, but even if this is the case, the results are 
not shown. 
Moreover, Beyea maintains that by choosing the parameters at ran-
dom from uniform distributions, he ensures that the cases with 
worst consequences will be taken into account (page II-8). This 
is not so. By using a uniform distribution, instead of a more 
realistic distribution, he only increases the probability that 
cases with large consequences will result from the simulations. 
The "probability distributions" calculated in Beyea's report are 
not probability distributions in the normal sense as Beyea him-
self admits (page 1-1, appendix I). As earlier pointed out, it 
is unreasonable to assume an almost total lack of knowledge of 
plume rise, as well as of the dry deposition velocity v . The 
"probability distributions" given in Beyea's report therefore 
only give an impression of how much the doses can vary when 
some of the parameters are varied. 
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The considerations of the sensitivity of the results to the as-
sumed probability distributions of the parameters are only cor-
rect if these distributions have the true mean value and variance. 
While range, which is a measure of variance, is varied in Beyea's 
sensitivity analyses, the mean values, which are decisive for 
determining at which level the variation takes place, are appar-
ently unvaried. 
Moreover, the significance of changes in the wet deposition 
parameter is not investigated. 
Considering how sensitive doses, and especially the consequences 
of doses are to changes in both plume rise and deposition par-
ameters, it is essential to vary the mean values for these par-
ameters . 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
As is the case in Risø Report No. 356, Beyea bases the calcu-
lation of early fatalities on the probabilities given in WASH-
1400. He classifies the doses in intervals of 50 rem, but instead 
of using the mean probabilities for early fatalities in these 
intervals, he uses the probabilities corresponding to the 
largest doses in the intervals. 
Beyea admits (page J-13) that this is open to criticism, but he 
maintains that the effect is not significant. It implies, how-
ever, that in calculating the number of early fatalities all 
doses are increased to a multiple of 50 rem. Because the number 
of fatalities is an increasing function of the dose, the effect 
of Beyea's approximation is dose-dependent. When the number of 
fatalities calculated by Beyea is larger than 1000, the number 
should be divided by approximately 2. When the number is between 
100 and 1000, it should be divided by 5-6, and when the calcu-
lated number is less than 100, it should be divided by more 
than 10, in some cases by infinity. 
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY 
17 
Beyea asserts that the only uasis that exists for calculating 
the probability of a catastrophic reactor accident is the fact 
that by the end of 1976, the total number of world reactor-years 
of commercial operation for large (500 MWe) nuclear plants was 
about 300 without the occurrence of any core melt-downs. On this 
basis he estimates the chance of a catastrophic accident occur-
ring during the lifetime of the two Barseback plants to be no 
greater than one in five (page 1-27). 
Accepting this form of argument would bring all technological 
development to a standstill as the probability of a catastrophe 
occurring to any technical innovation would be 1. 
However, even if this method is applied,there is no argument for 
only considering reactors of more than 500 MWe. At present, 
western countries have accumulated experience from approximately 
1400 reactor years, of which 700 years are light-water-reactor 
and 700 magnox-reactor years. In addition, approximately 1500 
reactor years of experience have been accumulated with military 
light-water-reactors. During these more than 2000 light-water-
reactor years there has been one accident (Browns Ferry), which 
in accordance with appendix C of Beyea's report had a probability 
of between 1:300 (Rasmussen) and 1:70-1:8 (Michael Grupp) of 
leading to a core melt-down. The probability that such a core-
melt accident would have the nature of a catastrophe (i.e. more 
than one early fatality after 24 hours of exposure, assuming 
minimal medical treatment after the irradiation) is, according 
to fig. 1-3, page 1-17, less than 1:4. Therefore the probability 
of a catastrophe at Barseback lies between 1:40 000 and 1:1000 
during the operational lifetime of the two reactors, if Beyea's 
method is applied. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objections to Beyea's calculations may be summarized in 
three points: 
1. Compared to Risø's model, Beyea's model includes some rough 
approximations that all give rise to unnecessary overestimations 
of the doses and the consequences - in particular the early ones. 
2. Beyea's analyses and conclusions depend critically on the 
type of a number of meteorological situations and on the meteoro-
logical processes dependent on these situations. By considering 
plume rise, deposition velocity, wind speed, wind direction, 
stability and precipitation partly as independent quantities, 
and not taking into account what probability there is for the 
combination of the parameter values, he obtains results that 
partly rest on a series of non-physical situations. It is in 
fact these situations, which give very large doses, that imply 
a large number of early fatalities, because of the non-linearity 
between doses and early consequences. 
3. Beyea uses the Gaussian dispersion model for distances up 
to 1000 km, although normally the model is only considered valid 
within approximately 20-50 km. 
In table 1-7, page 1-21, Beyea summarizes his results of calcu-
lations for wind directions towards Copenhagen. Twenty-four hours 
of irradiation, minimal medical treatment and no rain are 
assumed. Provided that a large accident has happened at Barseback, 
and that the wind direction is towards Copenhagen, then he finds 
the following probabilities of early fatalities in Denmark: 
BWR 3 accident: <1% probability for early fatality 
BWR 2 accident: <1% " " " " 
BWR 1 accident: 50% " " 0 early fatalities 
10% " " > 100 early fatalities 
1% " " > 10000 errly fatalities 
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The difference between these results and the results of Risø 
Report No. 356 is that Beyea's simulations lead to early fatal-
ities in up to 50% of the BWR 1 accidents, while Risø finds 
that such fatalities are unlikely on Danish territorry. 
In this connection is must be remarked that alone Beyea's choice 
of AH and v makes many of his dose calculation results too 
9 
large (cf. figure 4) - unless Risø's assumptions concerning 
both AH and v are incorrect. g 
Additionally, the doses to the population in the most exposed 
sub-area will in some cases be overestimated because of the 
assumption that the whole population is outside during the pass-
age of the plume. 
Moreover,the average dose for the most exposed population in 
Copenhagen is too large-because of the unsuitable placing of 
the areas in relation to the Sound, cf. fig. 1 - and the calcu-
lated average dose is furthermore increased to the nearest mul-
tiple of 50 rem in the evaluation of the consequences. 
In short, we are o* the opinion that 50% of the BWR 1 simu-
lations, which according to Beyea's interpretation may imply 
early fatalities, can be dismissed on the background of an un-
realistic choice of parameters and too rough a method of calcu-
lation. 
This is not in disagreement with Beyea's statements that "Rela-
tively minor mistakes or questionable assumptions in accident 
simulations could conceivably have ver/ large effects on predic-
tions" (page 1-16), and that his method will hardly underestimate 
the probability of the worst case consequences by more than a 
factor of ten, but that, on the other hand,his approach "can 
overestimate the prompt deaths by a very large numerical factor 
(including infinity)" (page II-8). 
The conclusion of Risø*s evaluation of Beyea's report is that 
its results, as far as early consequences are concerned, are 
strongly overestimated due to rough approximations and inclusion 
of unrealistic parameter sets. Moreover, Bey»a's report does 
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not point out any errors in the calculations described in Risø 
Report 355, so we find it proper to maintain that early fatal-
ities are unlikely on Danish territory. 
The long-term consequences are less dependent on the choice of 
parameter values. They are, however, to a certain degree influ-
enced by the different approximations in Beyea's method. Further, 
it should be remembered that the calculations in Beyea's report 
rest on the same conservative assumptions as listed in the sum-
mary of Risø Report 356. 
